![]() ![]() These ideal-types are argument from constitutional identity (Chapter 2), common sentiment (Chapter 3) and universal reason (Chapter 4). The first part identifies and analyses three common ethical reasoning ideal-types from a comparative constitutional perspective. ![]() This book aims to elucidate the use of ethical or moral arguments in constitutional reasoning by searching for their metaethical foundations. I further argue that since response-dependence accounts that tie morality to any sort of affect (be it an emotion, a desire, a desire to desire, or so on) cannot explain the objectivity and universality of morality and since we do not need a psychological response to play a truth-constituting role in morality in order to explain the normativity or content of morality, we should reject such response-dependence accounts.Ĭourts, no doubt, can get moral answers wrong, but can they also get morality itself wrong? This is the ambitious question asked by Boško Tripković in The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in the way predicted by the response-dependence theorist who wishes to tie morality to emotional affect. Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). ![]()
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